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Abstract: We contribute to the research stream examining the effects of World Bank lending 
programs on economic growth in developing economies. We contend that it is important to 
distinguish between the short-term effects and extended exposure of countries to these lending 
programs and also to assess the Bank’s (late 1990s) reforms to improve the effectiveness of these 
programs in recipient countries to assess whether program lending has any positive impacts on 
economic growth. Our comparative cross-national findings using instrumental variables analysis to 
control for endogeneity between program participation and economic growth demonstrate that 
both the short-term and longer exposure to program lending worsens economic growth. We find no 
evidence that World Bank reforms improved economic growth rates in the post-reform (1999–2009) 
period. Our findings are robust to changes in model specifications and estimation techniques. 
Future research should examine whether these reforms had beneficial impacts in other societal areas 
affected by program lending. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the early 1980s, the World Bank has used program lending (PL)1 as one of its main tools 
to promote economic development in the developing world. Relatively little research examines the 
economic growth consequences of the Bank’s approach to development. The vast majority of research 
analyses the economic growth consequences of International Monetary Fund (IMF) activities. This 
article consolidates our understanding of the economic growth consequences of World Bank PL since 
the Bank’s shift in policy in the early 1980s and whether the reforms in the late 1990s, discussed in 
more detail below, improved the Bank’s record promoting economic growth in countries under these 
programs. 
We make two novel contributions to the literature. Our first contribution is to assess the 
consequences of short-term and longer exposure to these programs on recipient countries’ economic 
growth rates. We believe that the lack of both theoretical and empirical distinction between the short-
term effects and the consequences of extended exposure to PL on economic growth has led to much 
confusion in the literature about whether program lending has a positive impact on participating 
countries’ rates of economic growth. This is pertinent especially since even defenders of the program 
lending approach concede that, in the short-term, PL may worsen growth rates but that, over time 
and with greater exposure to these reforms, developing economies will grow more than if they had 
                                                 
1 While the World Bank introduced Sectoral Adjustment loans in 1984 as the mechanism for structural 
adjustment, they are essentially the same as Structural Adjustment Agreements (SAAs) (Harrigan and 
Mosley 1991). Therefore, for the purpose of this article, we will refer to those structural adjustment programs 
as program lending (PL). 
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not undertaken these changes (Rogoff 2003). We elaborate why the economic effects of PL may differ 
in the short-term in comparison with extended exposure and quantitatively test our arguments. The 
second contribution is to investigate the economic growth consequences of institutional changes at 
the Bank in the late 1990s. These institutional changes were designed to improve the effectiveness of 
these programs in recipient countries. By extending our empirical analysis to 20092, we believe that 
it is now possible to provide a quantitative appraisal of these reforms on economic growth. 
Our analysis of 131 developing countries with a population of at least 500,000 covers the entire 
period (1981–2009), as well as the pre-reform (1981–1998), and post-reform (1999–2009) periods. We 
find that longer exposure to program lending significantly worsened economic growth rates in 
participant countries in each of these periods. We also find evidence that that short-term exposure to 
program lending significantly worsened economic growth rates over the entire period (1981–2009), 
as well as the pre-reform (1981–1998), and post-reform (1999–2009) periods. A mix of economic, 
political and demographic factors also provided important explanations for economic growth in 
developing countries. Our findings are robust to changes in the model and different estimation 
techniques, which we detail in the alternate specifications discussion. 
The results from our analysis lead us to question the efficacy of the World Bank’s program 
lending approach to encourage economic growth as a key linchpin for economic development. While 
the Bank remains one of the most important global development institutions our research indicates 
that not only has its approach to encouraging economic growth failed but also that these failures 
continue despite changes made in the late 1990s to make these programs more effective. For citizens 
living in countries under program lending conditions, there is little evidence that the Bank’s approach 
improves their national economic conditions. Our results also provide additional support to critics 
of the Bank’s approach to development. From a theory testing perspective, our results dispute 
arguments made by defenders of program lending (e.g., Rogoff 2003) that longer exposure to these 
programs will improve economic growth. We find no evidence that short-term exposure, longer 
exposure, pre-reform exposure or post-reform exposure to World Bank program lending encourages 
economic growth. 
The article is organized as follows. The next section discusses the pertinent literature that 
examines the economic impacts of World Bank program lending and provides the basis for our first 
set of hypotheses examining the overall relationship between program lending and economic growth. 
We then narrow the discussion to examine the World Bank institutional reforms in the mid-to late 
1990s and its implications for economic growth. This provides the theoretical underpinning for our 
second set of hypotheses. Section 3 presents our research design. Section 4 shows our results. The 
final section concludes. 
2. Theoretical Framework: Economic Consequences of the World Bank Lending Programs 
The debate over the effectiveness of foreign aid to foster economic growth spans several decades, 
but the financing gap model, based on the Harrod–Domar Growth model (Domar 1946; Harrod 1939), 
provides the backdrop to the contemporary dispute on aid efficiency.3 The financing gap model 
proposes that sufficient international aid, including WB loans, could promote investment in 
infrastructure and human capital, thereby increasing exports and inward investment as a tool to close 
the foreign exchange and saving gaps. Proponents of the model point out the positive record of small 
discrete development and emergency interventions (Riddell 2007, p. 170) that are often not congruent 
with the results of studies such as ours, evaluating the effects of more comprehensive programs. 
In this paper, we side with authors who argue that “financing the gap’” is insufficient to spur 
economic development and that aid effectiveness is contingent on the policy environment of the 
recipient (Burnside and Dollar 2000, 2004a, 2004b; see also Collier and Dollar 2002; Kenny 2008; 
                                                 
2 The limit of available data. 
3 The Harrod–Domar Growth model benefitted from subsequent refinements made by Chenery and Strout 
(1966) in their two-gap model of economic growth (the existence of a “savings gap’ and a “foreign exchange 
or trade gap”). 
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Mallick and Moore 2008; World Bank 1998). In short, aid can induce growth solely in countries with 
good fiscal, monetary and trade policies (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). In extension, Wane notes 
that “aid agencies have the capacity to direct good aid even in bad environments by adopting an 
incentive system that only rewards good projects” (Wane 2004, p. 23). Other scholars view that aid 
effectiveness is conditional on some recipients’ characteristics, but they disagree on which 
characteristics matter (see Kenny 2008, pp. 334–35; Wane 2004, p. 2). In contrast, some analysts argue 
that aid can be effective regardless of the public policies pursued by recipients (Clemens et al. 2006; 
Dalgaard et al. 2004; Hansen and Tarp 2000, 2001; Irandoust and Ericsson 2005). Yet, others find no 
consistent evidence that aid encourages economic growth, regardless of the circumstances and 
policies implemented (Rajan and Subramanian 2008; Easterly et al. 2004). 
Scholars have also noted a lack of consensus on the aid–development nexus under the leadership 
of the World Bank (see among others Arndt et al. 2010; Bourguignon and Sundberg 2007). On one 
side, Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya (2005) and Marchesi and Sirtori (2011), assert that World Bank 
programs have a positive effect on growth. On the other side, Bird and Rowlands (2001), and Easterly 
(2005) find little support for such positive connection. These authors reinforce the findings of Dollar 
and Svensson (2000), who conclude that domestic political economy forces “influence strongly the 
success or failure of reform programs supported by adjustment loans. We find no evidence that any 
of the variables under the World Bank’s control affect the probability of success of an adjustment 
loan” (p. 895). Some of these research findings indicate that discrepancies can be attributed to the 
“micro-macro paradox” (Mosley 1987, p. 139).4 Most micro-level studies accentuating qualitative 
assessments of specific projects or programs, tend to find that they are effective (Blackmon 2008; 
White 2007). On the contrary, most macro-level research, to which this article belongs, using large 
cross-national datasets, report that program lending has either no discernible or negative impacts on 
economic growth. 
We hope to reconcile some of these mixed views by providing some theoretical improvements 
to the debate. First, we argue that it is necessary to differentiate between the short-term consequences 
of PL and the effects of greater exposure to PL on economic growth. Much of the foregoing literature 
has examined, when countries are under programs in a given year, what we define as the short-term 
effects of program lending (for example Vreeland 2003). Other research has made the case that these 
programs were often designed to make sustained changes to the economy that took place over time 
(Abouharb and Cingranelli 2007; Birdsall and Londoño 1997). Some research has examined the 
cumulative effects of IMF program and World Bank program lending and finds little positive effect 
on economic growth (Easterly 2005). Some research has evaluated the cumulative economic, social, 
and physical integrity rights effects of spending longer under World Bank, and IMF program lending 
(Abouharb and Cingranelli 2006, 2007, 2009). They find that countries which spend longer under 
these programs have lower life expectancies, reduced literacy rates, and worsened human rights 
records. Many of these worsened rights outcomes may slow subsequent rates of economic growth 
(e.g., Barro 1997) because they undermine some of the key drivers of economic development. In 
contrast, if defenders of these programs (e.g., Rogoff 2003) are correct, then we should expect that 
developing economies who have greater exposure to these reforms will over time grow more 
efficiently than if they had not undertaken these changes. For these reasons, we examine whether 
longer exposure to these programs had any benefits on recipient countries’ economic growth rates. 
Differentiating between short-term effects and longer exposure to PL produces a more nuanced 
understanding of the relationship between these programs and economic growth. 
Second, in addition to distinguishing between the short-term and longer exposure effects of PL, 
it is also important to unpack the economic growth consequences of reforms made by the Bank in the 
mid-to late 1990s, which were designed to improve the effectiveness of these programs in recipient 
countries. While recent econometric studies cover a variety of periods, none of them estimates the 
effects of such loans up to 2009.5 Extending the period of study to 2009 allows us to provide the most 
                                                 
4 For a skeptical view of the existence of the micro–macro paradox, see Arndt et al. (2010). 
5 Kilby (2009), who evaluates the influence of the United States on World Bank disbursements between 1984 
and 2005, comes closer to covering the same period as ours. Dreher et al. (2009) cover the longest period 
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comprehensive updated analysis of these programs and to account for the Bank’s reforms in the mid-
to late 1990s.6 
While there is a debate in the literature about whether these types of programs promote 
economic growth, we argue, along with others (Abouharb and Cingranelli 2007; Dreher 2006; 
Hutchison and Noy 2003; SAPRIN 2004; Rajan and Subramanian 2008; Vreeland 2003), that the most 
persuasive evidence is that PL has deleterious effects on economic growth. The mechanisms through 
which PL may impede growth range from deep government budget cuts (Mosley et al. 1995), harsh 
financial discipline (Abouharb and Cingranelli 2007), insufficient account of initial human and 
physical distribution of assets (Birdsall and Londoño 1997) and flawed economic liberalization 
policies governments enacted as part of many PL packages (Stiglitz 2002).7 PL may have led to 
soaring interest payments crowding out public investments in basic services and infrastructure 
(Abouharb and Cingranelli 2007, pp. 9–12). In addition, Feyzioglu et al. (1998, p. 30) point to an 
inherent difficulty in monitoring the conditions associated with a loan, as aid-recipient countries 
could reduce their own investments in the sector that receives aid and transfer them to other sectors 
of the budget. Another reason why aid effectiveness must be questioned stems from Rajan and 
Subramanian (2011)’s argument that foreign aid may induce a “Dutch disease” phenomenon, where 
production shifts from tradable goods and services towards non-tradable goods and services, thus 
putting upward pressure on the exchange rate of a recipient country, resulting in its decline of relative 
international competitiveness.8 These considerations lead us to cast some doubts on the positive 
relationship between World Bank PL and economic growth: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1). In the short-term program lending worsens the recipient country’s economic growth rate. 
Hypothesis 2 (H2). Longer exposure to program lending worsens the recipient country’s economic growth 
rate. 
While these hypotheses represent our expectations over the entire period under examination, 
the Bank undertook major reforms in the late 1990s to try and improve the functioning of program 
lending as a tool for promoting development. Improving rates of economic growth remains key to 
the Bank’s vision of reducing poverty in the developing World. We examine these reforms and their 
implications for economic growth next.  
2.1. World Bank Institutional Reforms in the Late 1990s 
Under the presidency of James Wolfensohn (1995–2005), the World Bank, in a joint effort with 
the IMF under the Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF), initiated a new agenda to make 
program lending more effective and help the Bank fulfil its role in alleviating poverty in the 
developing World. The new objectives came in reaction to mounting criticisms from all circles 
asserting that the Bank lacked any attention to the Voice for the World’s Poor (Wolfensohn 2005). 
                                                 
(1970–2004), another study (Marchesi and Sirtori 2011) focuses on a relatively long period (1982–2005), while 
Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya (2005) extend their analysis as far back as the 1970s (1975–1999). Most articles 
surveyed have a starting point in the 1980s: Dollar and Svensson (2000) focus on the years 1980–1995, Easterly 
(2003) evaluates the impact of structural adjustment on poverty for the years 1980–1998, the duration of two 
other studies is 1980–1999 (Easterly 2005; Montinola 2010) and finally, Guillaumont and Laajaj (2006) pay 
attention to the years 1981–2002. Wane (2004), and Cull and Effron (2008) consider the periods 1990–2002 
and 1992–2003 respectively. 
6 We are careful to include country, regional, and time fixed effects to limit the bias on our results from 
particular national economic shocks and regional economic changes, for example the 1997–1999 Asian 
financial crisis, as well as global economic changes such as the 2008 and 2009 recessions. 
7 In a recent study, Bas and Stone (2014) argue that countries that are more interested in participating in IMF 
programs are the least likely to have favorable growth outcomes. Their hypothesis, based on an adverse 
selection model, could also be tested in future studies in the context of World Bank PL. 
8 While their argument is built on foreign aid in general, it is plausible to believe that PL may prompt a similar 
phenomenon. This constitutes fertile ground for future research. 
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Virulent criticisms targeted the negative impact of international financial institutions (IFI) 
conditionality on economic growth (see among many Collier et al. 1997; Santiso 2001). While the 
reforms were not expressly designed to improve rates of economic growth per se, we should expect 
the Bank, if successful, to foster program recipients’ economic growth in the post-reform period, since 
growth is often described as a key factor in the promotion of development. The first initiatives aimed 
at reducing poverty were the Participatory Poverty Assessments (PPAs) introduced in 1994. Armed 
with a global consultation with the poor in developing countries, their stated goal was to include the 
views of the less privileged in the Bank’s policy making (Robb 2002). It is, however, the Heavily 
Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC) and the Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 
Initiative (EHIPC), started in 1996 and 1999 respectively, that were set to have the largest impact on 
poverty reduction through debt relief and forgiveness.9  In order to benefit from the debt relief 
associated with these programs, recipient countries are required to fill Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Papers (PRSPs) conveying their own domestic poverty reduction strategies (Driscoll and Evans 2005). 
Introduced in 2001, the Poverty Reduction Support Credits (PRSCs) were intended to ease 
conditionality by helping countries implement comprehensive country-owned development 
strategies. PRSPs and PRSCs resulted in a better alignment between national development strategies 
and IFI adjustment lending, despite a few deficiencies (Independent Evaluation Group 2010, pp. 31–
41). At first glance, these initial results raise hopes that the World Bank is on track to foster economic 
development and alleviate poverty. 
A growing number of studies reviewed the abovementioned reforms undertaken by the World 
Bank in the mid-to late 1990s, which were designed to learn from the successes and failures of 
previous lending decisions (see among others, Blackmon 2008; Killick 2004; Marchesi and Sirtori 2011; 
Paloni and Zanardi 2006a; World Bank 2004; World Bank and International Monetary Fund 2004, 
2005). Whereas many of the aforementioned studies provide necessary micro-level assessments of 
the reforms, this article constitutes, to our knowledge, the first macro-level study of the impact of the 
reforms on economic growth.10 
In 2005, the World Bank issued a voluminous report, subtitled Learning from a Decade of Reform, 
assessing progresses made over the 1990s (World Bank 2005). According to Rodrik (2006), the report 
constitutes “a genuinely interesting document: it represents a mea culpa [sic] as well as a way 
forward” (p. 986). With our econometric analysis of the post-reform period, we are interested in the 
way forward, as mentioned by Rodrik. Did the World Bank reforms improve economic growth 
outcomes compared to the period prior to these changes? This is especially important as improved 
economic growth outcomes are one of the major linchpins of the Bank’s development strategy in the 
developing world. More debt relief, which formed part of these reforms may have made it easier for 
HIPC recipients to jump-start development. These lower debt payments freed money for 
governments to spend on goods and services (and potentially to lower tax rates on individuals and 
businesses), all of which may also encourage businesses and individuals to spend and invest 
increasing domestic economic growth rates. According to Blackmon (2008), the World Bank 
initiatives were more likely to be successful than the IMF in implementing an agenda that addresses 
poverty as a societal and development issue. Her micro-level analysis led her to conclude that the 
reforms were successful in four out of the five countries she studied (Tajikistan, Albania, Vietnam, 
and Mozambique, Cambodia being the exception) where government and civil society were engaged 
in an active dialogue with the Bank (Blackmon 2008, pp. 195–96). 
                                                 
9 The EHIPC was supplemented in 2005 by the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI), which allowed for 
100% relief on eligible debts by the World Bank, the IMF and the African Development Fund. Thirty-five 
HIPC and two non-HIPC countries have reached the completion point under EHIPC and received MDRI 
relief (International Monetary Fund 2013). While not all countries that received PL qualified for debt relief 
under (E)HIPC/MDRI, we find an important overlap between both programs. Data available from the 
authors. 
10 In fairness, Knack et al. (2012) also provide some much needed econometric analysis of the World Bank 
reforms by concentrating on countries’ graduation from the Bank for 1982 through 2012. 
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Despite Blackmon’s positive conclusions, for critics of the reforms, the conditionality of the late 
1990s was simply old wine in new bottles (Abouharb and Cingranelli 2009; Easterly 2006, Killick 2004; 
Weeks 2006). These critiques tend to focus on the negative economic and governance consequences 
of budget cuts to central government spending in areas such as public health and education, de-
regulation of different sectors of the economy and privatization of state assets, all reducing the size 
and scope of the state (Abouharb and Cingranelli 2007; SAPRIN 2004; Stiglitz 2002). The World Bank 
and International Monetary Fund have pressured loan recipient governments to rapidly privatize 
state assets, often with little regard for the transparency, fairness, and accountability of these 
processes (Stiglitz 2002). This approach to the sale of valuable state assets provided politicians with 
plenty of opportunities to engage in corrupt behavior, allowing their supporters to purchase these 
companies often at well below their market value: the privatization processes in Russia (Stiglitz 2002) 
and Mozambique (Hanlon 2004) provide two good examples of this type of state cronyism. Perhaps 
even more damaging is the critique that organizations such as the World Bank turned a blind eye to 
this corruption because of their own institutional agendas to keep lending (Stiglitz 2002; Hanlon 2004; 
Gamazo and Andrés 2018). In a startling admission, the World Bank, in a document entitled 
Strengthening Bank Group Engagement on Governance and Anti-Corruption, noted that it did not have the 
“required staffing, skills and incentives in governance to effect results-oriented changes at the front 
lines of Bank operations.” (World Bank 2007, p. 10) The Bank’s admission concerned their technical 
capacity to counter corrupt behaviors in loan recipient governments. Others argue that key 
supporters of the Bank such as the United Kingdom government do not explicitly make funding to 
partner countries conditional upon reducing corrupt behavior or the prosecution of corrupt 
individuals (Hanlon 2004). For example, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2018) have placed 
an emphasis on building capacity in countries with poor governance “to increase transparency and 
accountability … improve countries legislative frameworks … build capacity in state bodies … 
strengthen countries commitments and political will to tackle corruption.” If the approach taken by 
the Bank increases corruption, and its key backers remain reluctant to tackle that corruption directly, 
evidence indicates that the persistence of poor governance slows economic growth, impoverishes the 
majority of citizens, and shortens the lives of many people within these states (de Mesquita et al. 
2005). 
Examples also illustrate how the common provisions in program lending such as the 
privatization of states’ assets often lead directly to worsened economic and social rights outcomes for 
most citizens. The consequences of worsened economic and social rights outcomes may also slow 
rates of economic growth by having negative consequences on important components of human 
capital such as the health and therefore productivity of citizens. Privatization of the provision of 
potable water is a particularly interesting case in point. Besides reducing the size of the state, it helps 
loan recipients balance their budgets, end subsidies, and is a step towards deregulation of the 
economy. Health professionals agree on the link between access to safe and affordable water and 
public health. According to one estimate, over two million children die each year of diarrhea, a 
disease related to the lack of access to clean water (Grusky 2001). More than one billion people lack 
access to clean drinking water and approximately 2.5 billion have no sanitary means for disposing of 
human waste (Grusky 2001). Despite this knowledge and these conditions, in the 1990s, the World 
Bank and IMF adopted a policy of water privatization and full-cost water pricing. The concern 
expressed by the Bank and Fund was that the world is running out of fresh water sources at an 
alarming rate and that conflict over what remains is inevitable. Also, the Bank argued, governments 
of poor countries, which often subsidized the cost of providing potable water to their populations, 
had failed to deliver water to their populations efficiently (Alexander 2005). Based on this logic, water 
privatization became a fairly common program lending provision negotiated by both the IMF and 
the Bank. A review of 40 randomly selected IMF loan agreements reached in 2000 revealed that the 
IMF included provisions for water privatization in 12 of them—Angola, Benin, Guinea Bissau, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, Niger, Panama, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Tanzania, and 
Yemen (Grusky 2001). The consequences for public health were usually disastrous. In most cases, 
water users were almost immediately hit with rate hikes of 100% or more. Those who were unable to 
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pay higher prices turned to less safe sources of drinking water with serious negative public health 
consequences. 
World Bank lending programs that reduce the size and scope of the state have been criticized 
because they result in public spending cuts on health, education, and social welfare provision, which 
are also important components of human capital, and play an key role in promoting economic growth 
(Abouharb and Cingranelli 2007; SAPRIN 2004; Vreeland 2003). The evidence indicates that these 
cuts have not only have made it more difficult for citizens to access health care and education, often 
because user fees have been introduced or increased but now public sector workers are also engaged 
in corrupt behavior to compensate for the drastic cuts in their salaries due to World Bank imposed 
austerity measures (see Rose-Ackerman 1997; Hanlon 2004; SAPRIN 2004). In contrast to the severe 
public spending cuts, these loans provide large inflows of money to plug holes in central government 
budgets, which sometimes arose because governments were engaged in corrupt practices. Loans 
from international financial institutions papered over these cracks (Hanlon 2004). In other cases, 
corrupt leaders simply used loans and financial support to pay off their opponents, maintain their 
supporters and provide for a lavish lifestyle at the expense of their citizens health and well-being. 
The ongoing support from various United States administrations as well as the leadership of the 
World Bank and IMF for Zaire under President Mobutu is a good example. This support continued 
despite numerous reports about his kleptocratic behavior, the blurring of state and personal finances 
throughout his period in power, as well as the impoverishment and repression of the Zarian people 
(Ndikumana and Boyce 1998). Senior figures at the World Bank and IMF were well aware of the scale 
of corruption early on during Mobutu’s tenure of power. For example, the IMF appointed Erwin 
Blumenthal, a West German Banker, to lead an expatriate team at the Zarian Central Bank in 1978 
and 1979 to improve economic management in the country. In a report, he noted that the President 
made little distinction between state coffers and his own personal expenses. In 1979 Blumenthal 
resigned from his position concluding that the “impossibility of control of frauds’ meant that there 
was ‘not any—I repeat any—chance on the horizon that the numerous creditors of Zaire will recoup 
their funds’ (Blumenthal 1982, pp. 154–55). Despite this report, loans continued. The World Bank 
became the largest creditor to the Mobutu regime. The IMF also began lending to the regime despite 
strong opposition from within their own senior ranks (Ndikumana and Boyce 1998, p. 211). Mobutu 
was able to successfully court Western support by establishing Zaire as an anti-Communist bastion 
in central Africa, divvying up lucrative mineral concessions to foreign firms, while also having one 
of the most liberal foreign investment climates in Africa at the time (Ndikumana and Boyce 1998, pp. 
210–12). The result was that the political appointees running these international financial institutions 
and their political masters turned a blind eye to his misrule impoverishing Africa’s potentially richest 
state to the detriment of its long-suffering population. 
The World Bank’s own reports uncover mixed outcomes, some more successful than others 
subsequent to the reforms they implemented (Independent Evaluation Group 2006, 2010). Some of 
the criticisms levied at the PL reforms include inefficient redistribution of aid to HIPC countries from 
low-income-countries (Killick 2004), the inconsistencies of “high-profile” conditionality’s 
(stabilization, trade policy, privatization and restructuring of the private sector) with national 
ownership of development strategies (Weeks 2006; Paloni and Zanardi 2006b), lack of feedback from 
recipient countries (Easterly 2006) and an increased reliance of high-risk programmatic lending in 
contrast to smaller absolute dangers of failure associated with project modes (Killick 2004).11 Killick 
(2004) also observes “the expansion of spending on social services to the neglect of wider growth and 
developmental priorities” (p. 8), which should have a negative impact on long-term growth. 
Our research speaks to contrasting perspectives on the Bank, its role, and how we should 
evaluate its activities. Some work has argued that the wide range of development activities the Bank 
is involved in coupled with the expertise of Bank staff means that the institution has “tremendous 
policy influence” in partner countries’ development policies (Clemens and Kremer 2016, p. 54). 
Perhaps not surprisingly, Clemens and Kremer (2016, p. 54) are skeptical about the value of research 
that simply assesses the success of Bank policies with regression analysis that “use economic growth 
                                                 
11 Killick (2004), also argues that program aid is burdened by higher transaction cost than specific projects. 
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rates as the dependent variable and disbursements of aid as an explanatory variable will inevitably 
be quite misleading.” We agree that cash disbursements relative to the size of loan recipients’ 
economies are quite small (Clemens and Kremer 2016; Ravallion 2016) and that research which only 
took this approach would be liable to criticism. We side here with the acknowledgement of research 
to assess not only the poverty reduction outcomes of World Bank lending, but also try to establish 
the long- term consequences of the Bank’s lending policies (Ravallion 2016, pp. 83–84). One of the key 
goals of program lending is to encourage economic growth to facilitate poverty reduction in 
developing economies. If the Bank’s program lending approach has been successful in promoting 
economic growth, then this reflects positively on the Bank’s policy expertise and influence to 
encourage developing countries to undertake the necessary policy changes. We agree with the Bank’s 
laudable goals: by 2030 it wants to not only reduce extreme poverty, by decreasing the percentage of 
people living on “less than $1.90 a day to no more than 3%” but also to promote “shared prosperity 
by fostering the income growth of the bottom 40% for every country” (World Bank 2019). The 
question remains whether the World Bank PL approach actually encourages economic growth, a key 
linchpin in its goals of poverty alleviation. Confronted with inconclusive, contrasting and incomplete 
assessments of World Bank PL in the twenty-first century, we proceed with caution with the 
following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3 (H3). Pre-reform, the short-term effects and longer exposure to program lending worsen rates 
of economic growth. 
Hypothesis 4 (H4). Post-reform, the short-term effects and longer exposure to program lending improves rates 
of economic growth. 
3. Research Design 
We use a cross-national, annual time-series dataset utilizing the Correlates of War (2008) 
framework of 131 developing countries, with a population of at least 500,000 in 1981. We exclude 
OECD nations because they were not eligible for program lending. 
We use two different approaches to measure PL implementation. The first is a running count of 
the time countries spent under PL for the entire period. It is an appropriate way to examine whether 
countries with greater exposure to PL reforms had better rates of economic growth. The alternate 
approach, similar to Przeworski and Vreeland’s (2000) and Vreeland’s (2003) analysis of IMF 
programs on economic growth, simply examines whether a country is under program lending. In 
this alternative, we use a dichotomous indicator of whether a country was under a World Bank PL 
or not each year. The second measure allows us to examine any short-term benefits of PL on economic 
growth. We provide details on both indicators below. For our entire period of analysis, the World 
Bank negotiated 556 PL with countries in our sample. 
We account for a possible endogenous relationship between countries under World Bank PL and 
worsened rates of economic growth using an instrumental variable approach. In doing so, we follow 
the approach of studies that examined the impact of IMF lending on economic growth (Atoyan and 
Conway 2006; Bas and Stone 2014; Dreher 2006; Przeworski and Vreeland 2000; Vreeland 2003). 
In our analysis, we are interested in utilizing an instrument (the excluded exogenous variable) 
that directly impacts going under World Bank program lending and is only indirectly related to 
changes in economic growth. We utilize a measure of a governments’ dependent relationship with 
the United States (Hensel 2018) as our instrument for the following reasons. A considerable amount 
of research indicates the pivotal role that the United States plays in determining which governments 
are more likely to go under PL (Vreeland 2003; Stone 2004; Abouharb and Cingranelli 2006, 2007; 
Dreher 2006; Dreher et al. 2009; Dreher and Sturm 2012). The general argument made by the existing 
research is that governments which co-operate more with the United States (Vreeland 2003; Dreher 
2006; Dreher et al. 2009; Dreher and Sturm 2012), are allied with the United States (Abouharb and 
Cingranelli 2006, 2007) or have dependent relationships with the United States (Frey and Schneider 
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1986; Abouharb and Cingranelli 2004) are more likely to receive loans and these loans may come with 
fewer conditions (Stone 2004). 
It is important to note that our instrument can be indirectly related to changes in economic 
growth, the exclusion restriction is that it must not be directly related to changes in economic growth. 
There is good reason to believe that co-operation with the United States may benefit governments in 
their pursuit of economic growth. Yet the evidence indicates that these mechanisms are indirect, for 
example through trade policy (Council of Economic Advisors 2015), bilateral aid packages (Tarnoff 
and Nowels 2005), and increased foreign direct investment (e.g., Borensztein et al. 1998). This 
discussion provides a reasonable expectation that a measure of co-operation with the United States 
could be an appropriate instrument. Given the discussion of the literature above, there are a few 
potential candidates that we could use as an instrument. However, for an instrument to be useful in 
an analysis, it must also pass a set of stringent diagnostic tests that our instrument is relevant and 
that it is also strongly correlated with the endogenous variable (program lending). Some research 
examined how countries which voted more often with the United States in the UN General Assembly 
received more World Bank program loans (Dreher and Sturm 2012). Other research examined how 
the U.S. rewarded support from temporary members of the UN Security Council with loans from the 
World Bank (Dreher et al. 2009). Finally, some research examined how allies of the United States were 
more likely to receive World Bank program loans (Abouharb and Cingranelli 2004). While these 
measures predicted going under PL, they did not pass our diagnostic tests of being both relevant and 
strongly correlated. For these reasons, we chose whether the country has a dependent relationship 
with the U.S. based upon Hensel’s (2018) Issues Correlates of War (ICOW) Colonial History dataset as 
our instrument because it did pass our diagnostic tests of being both relevant and strongly correlated 
with our endogenous regressor (program lending). To be sure, had we used the other instruments, 
which did not pass these diagnostic tests, our results would have been similar to our single-stage 
analyses, which we discuss later. The included exogenous variables form the basis of our second-
stage regression equation and are displayed in our results. These variables directly affect our 
economic growth outcomes and are automatically included as instruments (StataCorp 2015, p. 
1119).12 
γi = Υiβ1 + α1i + μi (1) 
Υi = α1iΠ2 + α2i Π2 + υi (2) 
Here, γi is the dependent variable for the ith observation Υi represents the endogenous regressor 
(World Bank program lending). α1i represents the included exogenous regressors (Log GDPPC, 
Inflation Rates, Banks Domestic Credit Lending, Total Debt Service % GNI, Debt forgiveness, Net 
financial flows IBRD, Openness, Under IMF PL, Human Capital, Capital Stock Per Worker, Exchange 
Rates, Foreign Currency Reserves, Change in Population, Corruption, Bureaucratic Quality, Law and 
Order, Level of Democracy, Military Regimes, Workers Rights, Cold War, Civil War Incidence, Sub-
Saharan Africa region, Latin America and Caribbean region, East Asia and Pacific region). α2i  
represents the excluded exogenous regressor (USA Dependent/Colonial Experience). α1i and α2i are 
collectively called the instruments and μi and υi are zero mean error terms and the correlations 
between μi and the elements of υi are presumably non-zero (StataCorp 2015, pp. 1118). 
We use two stage least squares (TSLS), which is an appropriate instrumental variables estimator 
for our measure of the number of years under World Bank PL, which we treat as our endogenous 
regressor. Given the variety of estimators appropriate for examining the number of years under PL, 
we follow Baum et al.’s (2007) advice and present results in our appendices from Limited Information 
Maximum Likelihood Models (LIML), Generalized Methods of Moments Models (GMM), and 
Continuously Updated Estimator models (CUE). Consistent findings across these different estimators 
                                                 
12 We estimated our models using STATA 14.1. We utilized the “ivreg2” (Baum et al. 2010) command to 
estimate our TSLS, LIML, GMM, and CUE models. We utilized the “treatreg” command to estimate our 
treatment regression equations. 
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would provide us with greater confidence about the robust nature of our results. We utilize 
diagnostic tests to establish (a) that our key independent variable of theoretical interest (program 
lending) is endogenous to economic growth, (b) that our instrument is relevant, and (c) that our 
instrument is strongly correlated with the endogenous variable.13 
For our short-term effects models that examine the effects of simply being under World Bank 
program lending, we need to use a different instrumental variable model that is appropriate for the 
dichotomous nature of the endogenous regressor (being under World Bank PL or not in a given year). 
In this case, we use a Treatment Regression model, which allows us to estimate the effect of an 
endogenously chosen binary treatment (being under World Bank PL or not in a given year) on 
another endogenous continuous variable (economic growth). The structure of the model is the same 
as that discussed above but in this case, we are predicting going under World Bank program lending 
and then its subsequent effect on economic growth. Below, we elaborate on the operationalization 
procedures used for the key independent and dependent variables to ensure replication. 
3.1. Variables 
3.2. Number of Years under World Bank Program Lending 
Our numbers of years under World Bank PL variable is both a dependent variable in the first 
stage and an independent variable in the second stage of our model. This is a running count of the 
number of years under World Bank program lending. The measure comes from Abouharb and 
Cingranelli (2007) and is updated using individual country program lending information from the 
World Bank website. 
Since most PL packages last for three years and research has determined that on average it takes 
eighteen months for implementation to affect the economy, the results of the adjustment process 
should appear in years two, three, and four of the loan period (Jayarajah et al. 1996). For this reason, 
the three years after loan receipt were coded as a “one”. The year of negotiation was coded as a “0” 
unless a previously negotiated World Bank PL was still in effect that year. We generate a running 
count of the numbers of years under World Bank PL countries have spent during the period 1981–
2009. Thus, the number can range in theory from 0–29. A value of ‘29′ indicates that a country has 
been under PL for the entire period. The assumption here is that the longer a country has been under 
PL, the more it implements its provisions. This assumption is one followed by other studies on this 
topic (Przeworski and Vreeland 2000; Vreeland 2003). 
3.3. Under World Bank Program Lending or Not 
Our second measure is whether a country is under World Bank PL or not. This measure is our 
alternate dependent variable in the first stage and alternate independent variable in the second stage 
of our model. It estimates the short-term effects of going under World Bank program lending. This 
version closely resembles that used by Przeworski and Vreeland (2000) and Vreeland (2003) in their 
analysis of IMF programs on economic growth. We use a dichotomous indicator of the periods under 
program lending. Following the discussion above, years two, three, and four of any PL loan period 
are given a value of ‘1′ and ‘0′ otherwise. The major difference between this version and our longer 
exposure measure is that this indicator reflects the short-term effects of conditionality. Nevertheless, 
it is designed to capture the effects of these programs, since they would normally take a year at least 
to filter through to the economy as a whole. The measure also comes from Abouharb and Cingranelli 
(2007) and is updated using individual country PL information from the World Bank website. 
3.4. Dependent Variable: Economic Growth 
                                                 
13 Since our models include only one instrument, they are exactly identified and are by definition not over-
identified, meaning that a Hansen J-statistic indicating whether a model is over-identified is unnecessary in 
these analyses. TSLS models are appropriate with the use of one instrument (StataCorp 2005). 
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Our key dependent variable, a measure of economic growth, comes from Penn World Tables 8.0 
(Feenstra et al. 2013). It is the annual percentage change in GDP per Capita Constant 2005 Prices. 
Feenstra et al. (2013) recommend this measure as an appropriate dependent variable in studies that 
examine economic growth cross nationally over time. We generated this measure by lagging the 
original measure one year, and then calculating a percentage change from the annual difference. 
3.5. Control Variables 
Table 1 contains an overview of the variables selected for both stages of our analyses. We have 
discussed our choice of instruments and focus here on the economic growth stage of our analysis. To 
evaluate the impact of PL on economic growth of recipient countries, we use a conceptual framework 
similar to Abouharb and Cingranelli (2007), Dreher (2006), and Vreeland (2003). A variety of 
economic, international and domestic political factors as well as international financial institutional 
factors impact economic growth.14 Economic factors include the overall wealth and inflation rates of 
a country (Barro 2003), the role of domestic credit and human capital (Barro and Lee 2010) debt 
forgiveness (Clements et al. 2005), the amount of capital stock per worker (Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya 
2005), and foreign currency reserves (Vreeland 2003). Political factors include the role of good 
governance, particularly better maintenance of the rule of law (Barro 1997), limiting corruption 
(Acemoglu et al. 2005; De Mesquita et al. 2005) and constraints on power holders usually through 
more democratic institutional mechanisms (Barro 1997; Acemoglu et al. 2005; De Mesquita et al. 2005) 
within a country and if it is a military-led regime (Barro 1997; Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya 2005; 
Vreeland 2003). We included the size of the population, which provides some indication about the 
size of the potential workforce and market within a country (Barro 2003). Domestic conflicts also have 
consequences lowering economic growth (Collier 2008). Finally, variation in trade within regions 
changes rates of economic growth and, in the context of PL, research has stressed the importance of 
accounting for the regions of: Sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia and Pacific, and also Latin America and 
the Caribbean (Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya 2005). In addition to estimating our models with these 
regional fixed effects, all our models include yearly fixed effects. We present descriptive statistics in 
Appendix A. Pairwise correlations (not presented) indicate that our Sub-Saharan Regional dummy 
is most highly correlated with our measure of human capital at 0.51. However, Variance Inflation 
Factor (VIF) tests show that there are no problems of multicollinearity with our measure of Human 
Capital, which has a VIF score of 2.58 well below the threshold of 10 deemed to be problematic.15 We 
now discuss our results. 
Table 1. Operationalization of Variables. 
Second-Stage Dependent 
Variable Indicator Source 
Percentage change in GDP 
per Capita  
Percentage change in GDP per capita at 
constant 2005 prices  
Constructed from Penn 
World Tables (PWT) 8.0 
(Feenstra et al. 2013)  
Independent Variables   
Number of Years under 
World Bank program 
lending(PL)  
Running count of years a country has been 
under World Bank PL  
Abouharb and Cingranelli 
(2007) and updated using 
World Bank (WB) website 
program lending country 
reports  
Under World Bank PL or 
Not 
Dichotomous indicator under World Bank 
PL coded ‘1′ and ‘0′ otherwise  
Abouharb and Cingranelli 
(2007) and updated using 
WB website program lending 
country reports 
Control Variables   
                                                 
14 For an extensive discussion, see Abouharb and Cingranelli (2007). 
15 We use the “collin” command in STATA 14.1 to conduct VIF tests.  
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Economic   
Log of GDP per Capita Log GDP per capita at constant 2005 prices 
Constructed from PWT 8.0 
(Feenstra et al. 2013) 
Inflation GDP deflator  
World Development 
Indicators (WDI) (World 
Bank 2015) 
Domestic Credit 
Domestic credit provided by banking sector 
% of GDP 
WDI (World Bank 2015)  
Total Debt Service Total debt service % of GNI WDI (World Bank 2015) 
Debt forgiveness  
Change in debt stock due to debt 
forgiveness or reduction current U.S.$. 
WDI (World Bank 2015) 
Net Financial Flows 
Net financial flows International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) 
WDI (World Bank 2015) 
Openness  International trade % of GDP PWT 7.0 (Heston et al. 2011) 
Under IMF PL ‘1′ = Under IMF PL and ‘0′ otherwise Vreeland (2003) and updated 
using IMF Annual Reports 
Human Capital 
Human capital index based on years of 
schooling (Barro and Lee 2010) and assumed 
returns 
PWT 8.0 (Feenstra et al. 2013) 
Capital Stock per Worker 
Capital stock at current PPPs/number of 
persons engaged in the workforce 
Constructed from PWT 8.0 
(Feenstra et al. 2013) 
Exchange Rates Exchange rate to U.S.$ PWT 8.0 (Feenstra et al. 2013) 
Foreign Currency Reserves Numbers of months of imports WDI (World Bank 2015) 
Population change  Annual percentage change in population 
Constructed from WDI 
(World Bank 2015) 
Political   
Corruption 
0–6 Measure; higher values indicate less 
corruption within the political system, 
especially demands for bribes, payments, 
patronage and “favor for favors” 
PRS Group, ICRG (PRS 
Group 2019) 
Bureaucratic Quality 
0–4 Measure; higher values indicate higher 
quality of bureaucracy where institutional 
strength and expertise exists to govern 
without drastic changes in policy or 
interruptions in government services 
PRS Group, ICRG (PRS 
Group 2019) 
Law and Order 
0–6 Measure; higher values indicate 
stronger and more impartial judiciary and 
better observance of the law 
PRS Group, ICRG (PRS 
Group 2019) 
Level of Democracy 0–10 Democracy measure 
POLITY (Marshall and 
Jaggers 2010) 
Military Regime ‘1′ if military regime and ‘0′ otherwise Geddes et al. (2012) 
Workers’ Rights  
0–2 measure; 0 = Frequent (50+) violations, 1 
= Occasional (1–49 instances), 2 = None 
Cingranelli et al. (2014) 
(CIRI) (2014) 
Cold War ‘1′ = Cold War and ‘0′ otherwise Constructed 
Civil War Incidence  
0 = No civil war, 1 = 1000 battle deaths or 
more 
Gleditsch et al. (2002) Strand 
et al. (2005) 
Regions   
Sub-Saharan Africa; Latin 
America and Caribbean; 
East Asia and Pacific 
World Bank Definition WDI (World Bank 2015) 
First-Stage (World Bank 
PL) Dependent Variable 
  
USA Dependent/Colonial 
Experience 
The rule of the most recent possessor 
identifies the relationships under 
examination 
ICOW dataset (Hensel 2018) 
4. Results 
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In Tables 2 and 3, we present the results from our instrumental variables models (TSLS and 
Treatment Regressions) and contrast those results with single-stage Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
models that do not account for endogeneity. We begin with a discussion of our first-stage diagnostic 
tests presented in the lower portion of Table 2. Recall that we use the diagnostic tests to establish (a) 
that our key independent variable of theoretical interest (program lending) is endogenous to 
economic growth, (b) that our instrument is relevant, and (c) that our instrument is strongly 
correlated with the endogenous variable. 
Briefly, the results from our Durbin–Wu–Hausman diagnostic tests indicate that endogeneity 
exists between program lending and economic growth across all our TSLS models presented in Table 
2 at the 0.01-level of confidence or higher and is best estimated by an instrumental variable approach. 
Second, the instruments are relevant in all of our TSLS models presented in Table 2 indicated by the 
significant Kleibergen–Paap rk LM statistic at the 0.001-level of confidence. Third we find that our 
instrument is strongly correlated with the endogenous variable indicated by the Kleibergen–Paap 
Wald F statistics, which ranges between 72.27 and 132.58, well above the threshold of 10, indicating 
that the models do not suffer from weak instrumentation (Staiger and Stock 1997). The 
comprehensive nature of these diagnostic tests gives us confidence that our specifications properly 
instrument the endogenous process that makes some states more likely to go under program lending. 
In Tables 2 and 3, we now discuss the results from our instrumental regression models 
estimating the effects of program lending on economic growth over the entire 1981–2009 period. We 
undertake increasingly stringent tests of our argument. Beginning with a barebones model that just 
includes economic controls, we then add political controls, regional controls and finish by including 
only controls that were significant in the previous full model. We compare our TSLS models 
presented in Tables 2 and Appendix C where we present the effects of program lending on economic 
growth in the pre-reform (1981–1998) and post-reform (1999–2009) periods with those presented in 
Appendix B that utilize other instrumental variables estimators including the LIML, GMM, and CUE 
models. We contrast these findings with single-stage OLS models that do not control for endogeneity. 
The TSLS results we present in Table 2 displayed across the first three columns indicate that 
spending more time under PL significantly worsens economic growth over the 1981–2009 period. In 
our full model that includes regional controls, for each additional year a country spent under 
program lending, its economy contracted by −0.49 per cent.16 Countries that were never under PL on 
average grew at a rate of 7.0 per cent17; those under PL for the mean period of time (just over three 
years) had a growth rate of about 5.4 per cent18; those under PL for one standard deviation above the 
mean (just over eight years) had a growth rate of 3 per cent19; finally, those under PL for the maximum 
period of time (25 years), their growth rates actually contracted by −5.3 per cent20. When we examine 
the results from the other instrumental variables estimators displayed in Appendix B, we find strong 
support for the findings presented in Table 2, indicating the negative effects of greater exposure on 
economic growth for the 1981–2009 period. The alternate specifications presented in Appendix B 
indicate that for each additional year a country spent under program lending, its economy contracted 
by −0.49 per cent. In contrast, our single-stage OLS results that do not account for endogeneity, 
displayed in Table 2, indicate that greater exposure to PL had no significant effect on economic 
growth. If this single-stage model had been our preferred estimation technique, we would have 
erroneously concluded that greater exposure to PL had no significant effect on economic growth over 
the 1981–2009 period, much like Killick’s (1995) early work that wondered what all the fuss was about 
concerning the negative effects of these programs on economic growth. 
  
                                                 
16 Confidence intervals (C.I.) range from −0.73 to −0.26 per cent. 
17 C.I. range from + 5.5 to + 8.5 per cent.  
18 C.I. range from + 4.7 to +6.1 per cent. 
19 C.I. range from + 2.5 to +3.5 per cent. 
20 C.I. range from −9.7 to −0.9 per cent. 
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Table 2. Two-Stage Least Squares: World Bank Program Lending and Its Effects on Economic Growth, 
1981–2009, All Developing Countries. 
 
Only 
Economic 
Factors 
Adds Political 
Controls 
Adds Regional 
Controls 
Only 
Significant 
Results  
Single-
Stage OLS 
 1981–2009 1981–2009 1981–2009 1981–2009 1981–2009 
Number of Years under  −0.35 ** −0.31 ** −0.49 *** −0.62 *** −0.02 
World Bank PL  (0.13) (0.11) (0.12) (0.13) (0.04) 
Log of GDP per Capita 0.59 *** 0.61 *** 0.38 ** 0.56 *** 0.28 
 (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.15) (0.15) 
Inflation −0.00 ** −0.00 ** −0.00 ** −0.00 * −0.00 *** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Domestic Credit −0.01 * −0.01 ** −0.02 *** −0.03 *** −0.01 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
Total Debt Service 0.00 −0.01 0.01  −0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.03) 
Debt Forgiveness 0.00 * 0.00 0.00 ** 0.00 −0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Net Financial Flows −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 * −0.00 ** −0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Openness 0.01 *** 0.01 −0.00  0.01 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)  (0.01) 
Under IMF PL 0.40 0.96 *** 1.23 *** 1.71 *** 0.55 
 (0.27) (0.29) (0.32) (0.46) (0.31) 
Human Capital 0.02 0.72 0.47  0.65 
 (0.45) (0.50) (0.49)  (0.70) 
Capital Stock per 
Worker 
−0.00 *** −0.00 *** −0.00 *** −0.00 *** −0.00 *** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Exchange Rates −0.00 −0.00 * −0.00 *** −0.00 *** −0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Foreign Currency  0.15 *** 0.13 ** 0.09  0.20 ** 
Reserves (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)  (0.06) 
Population change 0.18 0.57 0.76 * 0.96 *** 0.58 
 (0.26) (0.31) (0.31) (0.24) (0.35) 
Corruption  −0.27 −0.36 * 0.31 −0.06 
  (0.16) (0.17) (0.24) (0.18) 
Bureaucratic Quality  0.15 0.36  −0.02 
  (0.18) (0.19)  (0.25) 
Law and Order  0.45 ** 0.41 ** 0.31 0.21 
  (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.17) 
Level of Democracy  0.02 0.04  0.00 
  (0.04) (0.05)  (0.06) 
Military Regimes  −0.27 −0.24  −0.49 
  (0.69) (0.70)  (0.98) 
Workers’ Rights  −0.02 −0.00  −0.14 
  (0.22) (0.23)  (0.28) 
Cold War  −3.88 ** −6.19 *** −9.66 ** 0.95 
  (1.34) (1.54) (3.04) (0.94) 
Civil War Incidence  −0.36 −0.65  −0.79 
  (0.32) (0.37)  (0.58) 
Sub-Saharan Africa   −1.80 *** −1.90 *** −1.92 ** 
   (0.48) (0.46) (0.65) 
Latin America and    −0.90 * −0.47 −1.10 * 
Caribbean   (0.37) (0.34) (0.50) 
East Asia and Pacific   1.21 * 2.15 *** 0.81 
   (0.50) (0.51) (0.80) 
Constant 1.41 −1.70 5.52 * 6.69 * −1.45 
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 (1.88) (2.24) (2.22) (3.02) (2.83) 
Observations 1848 1335 1335 1895 1335 
R-squared 0.37 0.52 0.47 0.29 0.19 
      
First Stage Results      
Under identification 
test:      
Kleibergen–Paap rk LM 
statistic 22.83 26.54 34.71 26.97  
Weak identification 
test:      
Kleibergen–Paap rk 
Wald F statistic 
72.27 117.21 132.58 94.57  
Stock–Yogo weak ID 
test critical values: 
     
TSLS 10% maximal IV 
relative bias: 
16.38 16.38 16.38 16.38  
Maximal IV size 
distortion 20%: 
6.66 6.66 6.66 6.66  
Test for endogeneity      
Durbin–Wu–Hausman 
test 7.4 ** 7.24 ** 15.67 *** 15.94 ***  
p > |z 0.05 *, 0.01 **, 0.001 *** All models were estimated with two-tailed significant tests and included 
time fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
In Table 3, we display the short-term effects of going under PL over the 1981–2009 period. We 
find a good deal of evidence that going under program lending worsens economic growth over the 
entire period, significant in both our model including political controls and our full model including 
regional controls. In contrast with Table 2, our short-term effects results are sensitive to model 
specification of only including significant results, they remain negative but are not longer significant. 
The results from our instrumental regression models provide strong support for hypothesis 2 that 
longer exposure to program lending worsens the recipient country’s economic growth rates over the 
1981–2009 period. We find a good amount of evidence for hypothesis 1, that in the short-term, 
program lending worsens the recipient country’s economic growth rates over the 1981–2009 period. 
These findings provide support for previous research such as Dollar and Svensson (2000), Bird and 
Rowlands (2001), and Easterly (2005) about the inability of the Bank to facilitate economic growth in 
loan recipient countries. 
Table 3. Treatment Regression: World Bank Program Lending and Its Effects on Economic Growth, 
1981–2009, All Developing Countries. 
 
Only Economic 
Factors 
Adds Political 
Controls 
Adds Regional 
Controls 
Only Significant 
Results 
Single-
Stage OLS 
1981–2009 1981–2009 1981–2009 1981–2009 1981–2009 
Under World 
Bank PL or  
−0.14 −3.36 * −3.92 *** −0.83 0.42 
Not (0.31) (1.48) (0.88) (0.55) (0.28) 
Log of GDP per 
Capita 
0.40 *** 0.57 *** 0.30 ** 0.07 0.26 
 (0.09) (0.12) (0.11) (0.06) (0.15) 
Inflation −0.00 ** −0.00 ** −0.00 ** −0.00 * −0.00 *** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Domestic credit −0.00 −0.01 * −0.01 ** −0.01 ** −0.01 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Total Debt Service −0.03 −0.03 −0.02  −0.02 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.03) 
Debt forgiveness −0.00 −0.00 −0.00  −0.00 
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 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) 
Net financial flows 0.00 0.00 −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Openness 0.02 *** 0.02 *** 0.01  0.01 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.01) 
Under IMF PL −0.14 0.35 0.40  0.36 
 (0.23) (0.24) (0.24)  (0.32) 
Human Capital 0.31 0.88 0.73  0.65 
 (0.47) (0.52) (0.49)  (0.70) 
Capital Stock Per  −0.00 *** −0.00 *** −0.00 *** −0.00 *** −0.00 *** 
Worker (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Exchange Rates 0.00 −0.00 −0.00 ** −0.00 −0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Foreign Currency  0.21 *** 0.20 *** 0.19 *** 0.14 *** 0.20 *** 
Reserves (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) 
Population change  0.13 0.49 0.64 * 0.14 0.57 
 (0.25) (0.30) (0.31) (0.10) (0.35) 
Corruption  −0.07 −0.04  −0.04 
  (0.14) (0.14)  (0.18) 
Bureaucratic 
Quality 
 −0.09 −0.03  −0.03 
  (0.16) (0.16)  (0.24) 
Law and Order  0.33 ** 0.20  0.19 
  (0.13) (0.12)  (0.17) 
Level of 
Democracy 
 0.01 0.01  −0.00 
  (0.04) (0.04)  (0.06) 
Military Regimes  −0.64 −0.70  −0.56 
  (0.68) (0.68)  (1.00) 
Workers’ Rights  −0.17 −0.21  −0.16 
  (0.20) (0.20)  (0.29) 
Civil War 
Incidence 
 −0.33 −0.67 * −0.94 * −0.77 
  (0.31) (0.33) (0.39) (0.59) 
Cold War   −1.25  1.09 
   (0.69)  (0.94) 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
  −1.87 *** −1.47 *** −1.88 ** 
   (0.47) (0.31) (0.65) 
Latin America and    −1.09 ** −1.12 *** −1.06 * 
Caribbean   (0.35) (0.24) (0.51) 
East Asia and 
Pacific 
  1.12 ** 1.15 *** 0.81 
   (0.42) (0.32) (0.84) 
Constant −1.73 −3.67 1.68 5.55 *** −1.61 
 (1.88) (2.50) (2.03) (1.25) (2.83) 
Athro 0.08 0.67 0.75 0.1 −− 
Observations 1848 1335 1335 2510 1335 
p > |z 0.05 *, 0.01 **, 0.001 *** All models were estimated with two-tailed significant tests and included 
time fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Our overall results provide no evidence for supporters of these programs (Rogoff 2003), that 
even with longer exposure they will result in improved rates of economic growth. Our results overall 
also contrast those of Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya (2005), who found that the Bank was able to improve 
growth rates. In the following subsections, we provide more nuanced analysis to assess if the 
economic growth consequences of World Bank PL have varied over time. 
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Columns I–V and VI–X of Appendix C indicate the effects of longer periods under PL on 
economic growth, pre- and post-reform respectively. These results indicate that greater exposure to 
PL worsened economic growth over the 1981–1998 period in all four of our TSLS models, significant 
at the 0.05-level of confidence or higher. In our full model that includes regional controls for the 1981–
1998 period, for each additional year a country spent under PL, its economy contracted by −0.64 per 
cent.21 If we turn to our alternate instrumental variables estimators in Appendix B, these provide 
consistent evidence for the negative effects of greater exposure to PL on economic growth over the 
1981–1998 period across all three alternate estimators at the 0.05-level of confidence. Again, had we 
simply used a single-stage model, also presented in Appendix C, we would have found that going 
under World Bank programs did not significantly worsen economic growth rates. These results 
provide support for our third hypothesis that the pre-reform period would be associated with 
worsened rates of economic growth.  
We examine Columns VI–X of Appendix C where our TSLS models indicate that in the post-
reform period, greater exposure to PL was negatively associated with economic growth over the 
years 1999–2009, significant at the 0.05-level of confidence or higher in our full model and model 
containing only economic controls, but are sensitive to the model specification of only including 
significant results. In our full model that includes regional controls for the 1999–2009 period, for each 
additional year a country spent under PL, its economy contracted by −0.25 per cent.22 As before, when 
we turn to our alternate instrumental variables estimators in Appendix B, we find strong and 
consistent support across all three variants that greater exposure to PL in the 1999–2009 period 
worsened rates of economic growth at the 0.01-level of confidence. Again, had we used a single-stage 
model like that presented in Appendix C, the result indicated greater exposure to PL had no 
significant effect on economic growth in the post-reform period and would have led us to erroneously 
conclude that greater exposure to World Bank PL played no part in recipient countries worsening 
economic growth rates over the 1999–2009 period.23 
Columns I–V and VI–X of Appendix D display the results for the short-term effects models in 
the pre- and post-reform period, respectively. The treatment regression results indicate that PL also 
had significant short-term negative effects on economic growth during the pre-reform (1981–1998) 
period across our full model including regional controls and our model which included only 
economic and political controls. The model was sensitive to model specification where we only 
included significant results from our full model. In our full model that includes regional controls 
going under PL worsened growth rates by −4.74%, significant at the 0.001-level of confidence.24 The 
results indicate significant negative associations between going under PL and worsened economic 
growth rates in the post-reform period (1999–2009) across all three treatment model specifications. In 
our full model that includes regional controls, going under PL worsened growth rates by −2.99%, 
significant at the 0.01-level of confidence.25 These results support hypothesis 1 that program lending 
worsens rates of economic growth in the short-term. Yet, as before, the results do not support our 
fourth hypothesis that economic growth rates would improve in the post-reform period. Finally, had 
we also used a single-stage model (also displayed in Appendix D) to examine the short-term 
consequences of PL on economic growth, we would have incorrectly concluded that PL played no 
role in worsening rates of economic growth in the post-reform period. 
                                                 
21 Confidence intervals range from −1.09 to −0.2 per cent 
22 Confidence intervals (C.I.) range from −0.41 to −0.09 per cent 
23 We also ran our models for the entire period with the addition of a post-reform dummy variable. This would 
reveal whether the post-reform period in general was associated with a different rate of economic growth. 
The dummy variable had a value of ‘1’ for the post-reform 1999–2009 period and a ‘0’ before. Our analysis 
indicated that the post-reform period was significantly associated with higher rates of economic growth at 
the 0.001-level of confidence or higher. Our measure of program lending, one indicating greater exposure, 
remained significant and negatively associated with economic growth rates at the 0.001-level of confidence. 
These results are available upon request from the authors. 
24 C.I. range from −6.71 to −2.79 per cent 
25 C.I. range from −4.79 to −1.18 per cent 
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The express purpose of these reforms was to successfully promote poverty reduction. The results 
indicate that they have failed to accomplish these macroeconomic objectives with little prospect of a 
commensurate reduction in poverty. This seems particularly problematic for the Bank, since the 
reforms were intended to learn from the mistakes of the past (Blackmon 2008) and improve the 
outcomes of these programs in developing countries. 
The twenty-one instrumental model specifications from our core results presented in Tables 2–
3 and Appendices B, C and D allow us to assess the consistent impact of various control variables on 
economic growth. We define our control variables as having a consistent effect if they were significant 
at the 0.05-level of confidence in more than half of the models presented and discuss them below. 
Wealthier countries, those with greater openness and higher levels of foreign currency reserves, are 
associated with faster rates of economic growth. In comparison, higher inflation rates, states with 
more domestic credit use, and those higher levels of capital stock were associated with a negative 
effect on economic growth. The latter two findings indicate that in states where the domestic banking 
sector provides more finance, and those with higher levels of capital stock, deserve further 
investigation and could reflect that more industrialized developing economies may tend to grow 
more slowly. 
Next, we turn to the effects of political factors. While there is some evidence about the effects of 
political factors on economic growth, many of the models indicate no significant relationship. We 
found no evidence linking higher levels of democracy and economic growth. We found a negative 
association between military regimes and economic growth and a negative association between the 
Cold War period and economic growth, but only in a minority of the models. Our results from our 
regional dummies reflect variations in growth over this period not captured by our individual 
country year data or the inclusion of annual fixed effects. They indicate that the regions of Sub-
Saharan Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean were associated with lower rates of economic 
growth in a majority of the models presented compared to East Asia and the Pacific. These results 
may well reflect arguments by the former Director General of the United Nations Food and 
Agricultural Organization Edouard Saouma that the 1980s in particular represented a lost decade of 
development for these regions (Ridley 1989). Our findings suggest that these overall negative trends 
may have continued throughout the period of this study. 
5. Discussion 
There is an important academic and policy debate about whether international aid encourages 
or discourages economic growth and what types of aid programs governments and international 
financial institutions should undertake (e.g., Sachs 2005; Easterly 2006). Economic growth is typically 
viewed as the linchpin for other aspects of economic development to take place (e.g., Barro 1997; 
2003). There is plenty of debate about the role of governments to distribute and redistribute wealth 
in ways that reduce poverty (Donnelly 2003) and help realize individuals economic and social rights 
(Abouharb and Cingranelli 2007). What remains fundamental to many of these discussions about 
poverty reduction and economic and social rights promotion is the need for governments to generate 
revenue through taxes, which they can subsequently spend in the areas of health, education, and 
social welfare. It is much easier for governments to make these spending commitments when the 
economy grows and generates revenues through employment and taxation. Our research indicates 
that World Bank programs fail in promoting economic growth and subsequently make the attainment 
of poverty reduction and the realization of economic and social rights more difficult. 
For policy makers interested in the ability of the World Bank to help alleviate poverty through 
its promotion of economic growth, our findings make for somber reading. While disappointing to 
read that the World Bank appears to be failing in its mission to promote economic growth, our results 
follow on from work by others on the negative effects of IMF program lending on economic growth 
(Vreeland 2003). Vreeland concludes that countries under IMF programs would have been better off 
if they had never gone under these programs in the first place. 
Future research could examine the consequences of PL and the changes that took place in the 
late 1990s in the arena of social indicators. Focusing on economic growth does little to inform us about 
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whether PL changes economic inequality in society. Second, PL may also affect gender equality in 
developing countries, with some arguing that those women are actually made worse off as a function 
of program lending (Elson 1991), and this deserves further examination. Finally, future studies must 
account for compliance with the terms of PL by recipient countries. We agree with Dreher (2006) and 
suggest that future studies of World Bank PL attempt to mimic his assessment of recipients’ 
compliance with the conditions associated with IMF loans. 
The intent of this project was to examine the effects of PL on economic growth. This is a 
profoundly important topic. While these programs are often unpopular in developing countries, 
governments pursue these policy changes under the advice of the World Bank, with the expectation 
that longer exposure to these programs will outweigh the potential short-term weight of the required 
adjustments. The results from this research indicate no support for such extended benefits of these 
programs on economic growth. 
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M. Rodwan Abouharb and Erick Duchesne; Writing – review & editing, M. Rodwan Abouharb and Erick 
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Appendix A. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Min Max 
Economic Growth % Change 3.07 8.06 −195.16 51.52 
Number of Years under World Bank PL 3.26 4.86 0 25 
Under World Bank PL 0.29 0.45 0 1 
Log of GDP per Capita 9.89 1.99 5.01 16.16 
Inflation 62.25 637.41 −32.8 26,762.02 
Domestic Credit 44.76 39.37 −79.09 333.99 
Total Debt Service 5.55 5.73 0 112.08 
Debt forgiveness 3.29 × 107 2.71 × 108 -1.35 × 107 9.67 × 109 
Net financial flows 1.70 × 107 2.40 × 108 −4.67 × 109 4.21 × 109 
Openness 80.58 47.64 1.03 443.18 
Under IMF PL 0.36 0.48 0 1 
Human Capital 2.17 0.55 1.09 3.54 
Capital Stock per Worker 50,381.44 63,635.52 677.89 586,831.3 
Exchange Rates 416.24 1533.13 4.17 × 10−12 17,065.08 
Foreign Currency Reserves 3.73 3.58 −0.09 43.69 
Population change 1.77 2.88 −124.51 36.25 
Corruption 2.61 1.06 0 6 
Bureaucratic Quality 1.77 1 0 4 
Law and Order 3.22 1.28 0 6 
Level of Democracy 3.67 3.78 0 10 
Military Regimes 0.07 0.26 0 1 
Workers’ Rights 0.8 0.72 0 2 
Cold War  0.32 0.46 0 1 
Civil War Incidence 0.16 0.36 0 1 
Sub-Saharan Africa  0.31 0.46 0 1 
Latin American and Caribbean 0.22 0.41 0 1 
East Asia and Pacific 0.14 0.35 0 1 
USA Dependent/Colonial Experience 0.02 0.14 0 1 
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Appendix B. Alternate Instrumental Variables Regression Models: Limited Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML), Generalized Methods of 
Moments (GMM) and Continuously Updated Estimator (CUE) Models: World Bank Program Lending and Its Effects on Economic Growth, 1981–2009, 
All Developing Countries with Regional and Annual Fixed Effects. 
 LIML Models GMM Models CUE Models 
 1981–2009 1981–1998 1999–2009 1981–2009 1981–1998 1999–2009 1981–2009 1981–1998 1999–2009 
          
Number of Years under  −0.49 *** −0.64 ** −0.25 ** −0.49 *** −0.64 ** −0.25 ** −0.49 *** −0.64 ** −0.25 ** 
World Bank PL (0.12) (0.23) (0.08) (0.12) (0.23) (0.08) (0.12) (0.23) (0.08) 
Log of GDP per Capita 0.38 ** 0.63 ** 0.18 0.38 ** 0.63 ** 0.18 0.38 ** 0.63 ** 0.18 
 (0.12) (0.23) (0.12) (0.12) (0.23) (0.12) (0.12) (0.23) (0.12) 
Inflation −0.00 ** −0.00 *** −0.00 −0.00 ** −0.00 *** −0.00 −0.00 ** −0.00 *** −0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) 
Domestic Credit  −0.02 *** −0.03 ** −0.01 −0.02 *** −0.03 ** −0.01 −0.02 *** −0.03 ** −0.01 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Total Debt Service 0.01 −0.02 0.02 0.01 −0.02 0.02 0.01 −0.02 0.02 
 (0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.02) 
Debt Forgiveness 0.00 ** 0.00 0.00 0.00 ** 0.00 0.00 0.00 ** 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Net Financial Flows −0.00 * −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 * −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 * −0.00 −0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Openness −0.00 0.01 −0.01 −0.00 0.01 −0.01 −0.00 0.01 −0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Under IMF PL 1.23 *** 1.41 ** 1.11 ** 1.23 *** 1.41 ** 1.11 ** 1.23 *** 1.41 ** 1.11 ** 
 (0.32) (0.48) (0.35) (0.32) (0.48) (0.35) (0.32) (0.48) (0.35) 
Human Capital 0.47 −0.78 1.19 ** 0.47 −0.78 1.19 ** 0.47 −0.78 1.19 ** 
 (0.49) (0.69) (0.43) (0.49) (0.69) (0.43) (0.49) (0.69) (0.43) 
Capital Stock per Worker −0.00 *** −0.00 *** −0.00 *** −0.00 *** −0.00 *** −0.00 *** −0.00 *** −0.00 *** −0.00 *** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Exchange Rates −0.00 *** −0.00 *** −0.00 * −0.00 *** −0.00 *** −0.00 * −0.00 *** −0.00 *** −0.00 * 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Foreign Currency  0.09 0.21 ** 0.01 0.09 0.21 ** 0.01 0.09 0.21 ** 0.01 
Reserves (0.05) (0.08) (0.06) (0.05) (0.08) (0.06) (0.05) (0.08) (0.06) 
Population change 0.76 * 0.83 * 0.34 0.76 * 0.83 * 0.34 0.76 * 0.83 * 0.34 
 (0.31) (0.38) (0.21) (0.31) (0.38) (0.21) (0.31) (0.38) (0.21) 
Corruption −0.36 * −0.23 −0.29 −0.36 * −0.23 −0.29 −0.36 * −0.23 −0.29 
 (0.17) (0.26) (0.18) (0.17) (0.26) (0.18) (0.17) (0.26) (0.18) 
Bureaucratic Quality 0.36 0.40 0.04 0.36 0.40 0.04 0.36 0.40 0.04 
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 (0.19) (0.26) (0.32) (0.19) (0.26) (0.32) (0.19) (0.26) (0.32) 
Law and Order 0.41 ** −0.05 0.40 * 0.41 ** −0.05 0.40 * 0.41 ** −0.05 0.40 * 
 (0.15) (0.22) (0.16) (0.15) (0.22) (0.16) (0.15) (0.22) (0.16) 
Level of Democracy 0.04 0.02 −0.03 0.04 0.02 −0.03 0.04 0.02 −0.03 
 (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) 
Military Regimes −0.24 −0.84 −0.38 −0.24 −0.84 −0.38 −0.24 −0.84 −0.38 
 (0.70) (0.82) (0.81) (0.70) (0.82) (0.81) (0.70) (0.82) (0.81) 
Workers’ Rights −0.00 0.01 −0.05 −0.00 0.01 −0.05 −0.00 0.01 −0.05 
 (0.23) (0.30) (0.28) (0.23) (0.30) (0.28) (0.23) (0.30) (0.28) 
Cold War −6.19 *** −2.58  −6.19 *** −2.58  −6.19 *** −2.58  
 (1.54) (1.50)  (1.54) (1.50)  (1.54) (1.50)  
Civil War Incidence −0.65 −1.48 ** 0.17 −0.65 −1.48 ** 0.17 −0.65 −1.48 ** 0.17 
 (0.37) (0.54) (0.37) (0.37) (0.54) (0.37) (0.37) (0.54) (0.37) 
Sub-Saharan Africa −1.80 *** −1.59 * −1.45 *** −1.80 *** −1.59 * −1.45 *** −1.80 *** −1.59 * −1.45 *** 
 (0.48) (0.72) (0.44) (0.48) (0.72) (0.44) (0.48) (0.72) (0.44) 
Latin America and  −0.90 * 0.02 −1.29 ** −0.90 * 0.02 −1.29 ** −0.90 * 0.02 −1.29 ** 
Caribbean (0.37) (0.56) (0.41) (0.37) (0.56) (0.41) (0.37) (0.56) (0.41) 
East Asia and Pacific 1.21 * 2.03 ** 0.64 1.21 * 2.03 ** 0.64 1.21 * 2.03 ** 0.64 
 (0.50) (0.78) (0.46) (0.50) (0.78) (0.46) (0.50) (0.78) (0.46) 
Constant 5.52 * 2.11 4.25 * 5.52 * 2.11 4.25 * 5.52 * 2.11 4.25 * 
 (2.22) (3.01) (1.90) (2.22) (3.01) (1.90) (2.22) (3.01) (1.90) 
Observations 1335 779 556 1335 779 556 1335 779 556 
R-squared 0.47 0.34 0.75 0.47 0.34 0.75 0.47 0.34 0.75 
First Stage Results          
Under identification test:          
Kleibergen–Paap rk LM statistic. 34.7 *** 19.1 *** 16.4 *** 34.7 *** 19.1 *** 16.4 *** 34.7 *** 19.1 *** 16.4 *** 
Weak identification test:          
Kleibergen–Paap rk Wald F statistic 132.6 51.9 51.7 132.6 51.9 51.7 132.6 51.9 51.7 
Stock–Yogo weak ID test critical values:          
10% maximal LIML size: 16.38 16.38 16.38  -- -- -- -- -- 
10% maximal IV relative bias: -- -- -- 16.38 16.38 16.38 16.38 16.38 16.38 
Maximal IV size distortion 20%: 6.66 6.66 6.66 6.66 6.66 6.66 6.66 6.66 6.66 
Test for endogeneity          
Durbin–Wu–Hausman test 15.7 *** 9.9 ** 6.6 ** 15.7 *** 9.9 ** 6.6 ** 15.7 *** 9.9 ** 6.6 ** 
p> |z 0.05 *, 0.01 **, 0.001 *** ¹Models were estimated with two-tailed significant tests and included time fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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Appendix C. Two-Stage and Single-Stage Least Squares: World Bank Program Lending and Its Effects on Economic Growth, Pre-and Post-Reform 
Periods, All Developing Countries with Regional and Annual Fixed Effects. 
 Pre-Reform Period Post-Reform Period 
 1981–1998 
Only Econ Factors 
1981–1998 
Adds Pol 
Controls 
1981–1998 
Adds Reg 
Controls 
1981–1998 
Only Sign. 
Results 
1981–1998 
Single-Stage 
OLS 
1999–2009 
Only Econ 
Factors 
1999–2009 
Adds Pol 
Controls 
1999–2009 
Adds Reg 
Controls 
1999–2009 
Only Sign. 
Results 
1999–2009 
Single-Stage 
OLS 
Number of Years −0.55 * −0.40 * −0.64 ** −0.65 ** 0.06 −0.10 * −0.11 −0.25 ** 0.02 −0.03 
Under WB PL (0.24) (0.19) (0.23) (0.24) (0.07) (0.04) (0.07) (0.08) (0.05) (0.04) 
Log of GDP per  0.82 *** 0.91 *** 0.63 ** 0.29 * 0.30 0.22 * 0.28 * 0.18  0.15 
Capita (0.18) (0.21) (0.23) (0.14) (0.22) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12)  (0.16) 
Inflation −0.00 ** −0.00 ** −0.00 *** −0.00 ** −0.00 *** 0.03 0.00 −0.00  0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.02) 
Domestic Credit −0.01 −0.01 −0.03 ** −0.00 −0.02 −0.00 −0.00 −0.01  −0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.01) 
Total Debt −0.00 −0.05 −0.02  −0.12 * 0.01 0.01 0.02  0.01 
Service (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)  (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.02) 
Debt  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 
Forgiveness (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) 
Net Financial −0.00 −0.00 −0.00  0.00 −0.00 −0.00 −0.00  −0.00 
Flows (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) 
Openness 0.03 *** 0.02 * 0.01  0.01 0.00 0.01 −0.01  −0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)  (0.01) 
Under IMF PL 0.27 1.07 * 1.41 ** 0.35 0.66 0.53 0.91 ** 1.11 ** 0.55 0.65 
 (0.36) (0.42) (0.48) (0.38) (0.41) (0.28) (0.33) (0.35) (0.35) (0.36) 
Human  −0.71 −0.34 −0.78  −0.43 0.52 1.15 ** 1.19 ** −0.86 * 1.20 
Capital (0.59) (0.66) (0.69)  (0.88) (0.39) (0.41) (0.43) (0.37) (0.66) 
Capital Stock  −0.00 *** −0.00 *** −0.00 *** −0.00 *** −0.00 *** −0.00 ** −0.00 *** −0.00 *** 0.00 −0.00 ** 
per Worker (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Exchange  −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 *** −0.00 −0.00 0.00 ** −0.00 −0.00 * 0.00 −0.00 
Rates (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Foreign Currency 0.24 *** 0.26 *** 0.21 ** 0.17 *** 0.32 *** 0.09 * 0.07 0.01  0.09 
Reserves (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.05) (0.08) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06)  (0.06) 
Population 0.19 0.79 * 0.83 * 0.25 0.78 * 0.03 −0.01 0.34  0.14 
change (0.30) (0.38) (0.38) (0.19) (0.36) (0.17) (0.20) (0.21)  (0.25) 
Corruption  −0.04 −0.23  0.20  −0.37 * −0.29  −0.24 
  (0.24) (0.26)  (0.30)  (0.17) (0.18)  (0.23) 
Bureaucratic   0.06 0.40  0.18  −0.17 0.04  −0.38 
Quality  (0.22) (0.26)  (0.33)  (0.29) (0.32)  (0.31) 
Law and Order  0.00 −0.05  −0.03  0.43 ** 0.40 * 0.25 0.19 
  (0.21) (0.22)  (0.20)  (0.15) (0.16) (0.18) (0.20) 
Level of   0.06 0.02  −0.03  −0.08 −0.03  −0.05 
Democracy  (0.06) (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.05) (0.05)  (0.07) 
Military   −0.33 −0.84  −0.42  −0.71 −0.38  −1.70 * 
Regimes  (0.77) (0.82)  (1.05)  (0.78) (0.81)  (0.69) 
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Workers’ Rights  0.09 0.01  −0.08  −0.08 −0.05  −0.12 
  (0.29) (0.30)  (0.32)  (0.27) (0.28)  (0.32) 
Cold War  −1.02 −2.58  1.88      
  (1.30) (1.50)  (0.99)      
Civil War  −1.22 * −1.48 ** −0.99 −1.15  0.44 0.17  0.04 
Incidence  (0.48) (0.54) (0.53) (0.66)  (0.33) (0.37)  (0.51) 
Sub-Saharan   −1.59 * −0.29 −2.21 **   −1.45 *** −1.28 * −1.47 * 
Africa   (0.72) (0.50) (0.77)   (0.44) (0.51) (0.60) 
Latin America   0.02  −0.25   −1.29 ** −0.97 * −1.31 * 
and Caribbean   (0.56)  (0.64)   (0.41) (0.40) (0.50) 
East Asia and   2.03 ** 2.32 *** 1.48   0.64  0.47 
Pacific   (0.78) (0.43) (0.96)   (0.46)  (0.72) 
Constant −2.47 −5.71 2.11 2.95 *** −1.64 1.78 0.33 4.25 * 6.70 *** 3.56 
 (2.42) (2.95) (3.01) (0.86) (3.49) (1.27) (1.68) (1.90) (2.03) (2.56) 
Observations 1164 779 779 1697 779 684 556 556 903 556 
R-squared 0.21 0.4 0.34 0.19 0.20 0.72 0.77 0.75 0.51 0.25 
First Stage Results           
Under identification test:          
Kleibergen–Paap rk 
LM statistic 
14.6 14.9 19.1 16.1 -- 10.4 11.9 16.4 10.8 -- 
Weak identification test:          
Kleibergen–Paap rk 
Wald F statistic 
39.4 45 51.9 40.3 -- 127.5 46.7 51.7 210.8 -- 
Stock–Yogo weak ID 
test critical values: 
          
TSLS 10% maximal 
IV relative bias: 
16.38 16.38 16.38 16.38 -- 16.38 16.38 16.38 16.38 -- 
Maximal IV size 
distortion 20%: 
6.66 6.66 6.66 6.66 -- 6.66 6.66 6.66 6.66 -- 
Test for endogeneity          
Durbin–Wu–
Hausman test 
6.5 * 5.2 * 9.9 ** 7.8 ** -- 1.2 1.2 6.6 ** 0.1 -- 
p > |z 0.05 *, 0.01 **, 0.001 *** All models were estimated with two-tailed significant tests and included time fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Appendix D. Treatment Regression and Single-Stage OLS: World Bank Program Lending and Its Effects on Economic Growth, Pre-and Post-Reform 
Periods, All Developing Countries with Regional and Annual Fixed Effects. 
 Pre-Reform Period Post-Reform Period 
 
1981–1998 
Only 
Economic 
Factors 
1981–1998 
Adds 
Political 
Controls 
1981–1998 
Adds 
Regional 
Controls  
1981–1998 
Only Sign. 
Results  
1981–1998 
Single-
Stage OLS 
1999–2009 
Only Econ 
Factors 
1999–2009 
Adds Pol 
Controls 
1999–2009 
Adds Reg 
Controls 
1999–2009 
Only Sign. 
Results 
1999–2009 
Only Sign. 
Results 
Under WB −0.22 −4.31 ** −4.74 *** −0.31 0.63 −2.90 ** −2.89 ** −2.99 ** −5.32 *** 0.36 
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PL or Not (0.41) (1.43) (1.00) (0.50) (0.34) (1.08) (1.10) (0.92) (0.56) (0.32) 
Log of GDP per 
Capita 
0.60 *** 0.81 *** 0.39 * 0.36 ** 0.32 0.14 0.26 * 0.15  0.13 
 (0.13) (0.18) (0.18) (0.11) (0.22) (0.10) (0.12) (0.11)  (0.16) 
Inflation −0.00 * −0.00 ** −0.00 ** −0.00 −0.00 *** 0.03 0.01 0.01  0.01 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.02) 
Domestic Credit −0.00 −0.01 −0.02 ** −0.01 −0.02 0.00 −0.00 −0.00  −0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.01) 
Total Debt −0.10 * −0.13 ** −0.13 ** −0.12 ** −0.12 * 0.00 0.01 0.02  0.01 
Service (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.02) 
Debt 
forgiveness 
0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 −0.00 −0.00 −0.00  −0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) 
Net Financial 0.00 0.00 −0.00  0.00 −0.00 −0.00 −0.00  −0.00 
Flows (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) 
Openness 0.03 *** 0.03 *** 0.02 * 0.02 *** 0.02 0.01 * 0.01 ** 0.00  0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.01) 
Under IMF PL −0.13 0.51 0.63  0.51 0.13 0.47 0.41  0.45 
 (0.32) (0.35) (0.35)  (0.42) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29)  (0.36) 
Human Capital −0.10 −0.05 −0.35  −0.49 0.46 1.18 ** 1.24 ** −0.29 1.23 
 (0.59) (0.65) (0.64)  (0.89) (0.37) (0.41) (0.40) (0.30) (0.67) 
Capital Stock 
per 
−0.00 *** −0.00 *** −0.00 *** −0.00 *** −0.00 *** −0.00 ** −0.00 *** −0.00 *** −0.00 ** −0.00 ** 
Worker (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Exchange Rates −0.00 −0.00 −0.00 * −0.00 −0.00 0.00 ** −0.00 −0.00  −0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) 
Foreign 0.30 *** 0.31 *** 0.29 *** 0.26 *** 0.31 *** 0.12 ** 0.11 ** 0.10 * 0.07 * 0.10 
Currency 
Reserves 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.08) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) 
Population  0.17 0.81 * 0.85 * 0.17 0.78 * −0.02 −0.08 0.14  0.11 
change (0.30) (0.38) (0.37) (0.21) (0.37) (0.15) (0.19) (0.18)  (0.25) 
Corruption  0.19 0.15  0.17  −0.33 * −0.22  −0.22 
  (0.21) (0.21)  (0.28)  (0.17) (0.17)  (0.22) 
Bureaucratic   −0.08 0.21  0.22  −0.42 −0.49 * −0.28 −0.44 
Quality  (0.21) (0.22)  (0.32)  (0.23) (0.23) (0.19) (0.30) 
Law and Order  0.05 −0.00  −0.02  0.29 * 0.13  0.13 
  (0.19) (0.19)  (0.20)  (0.13) (0.14)  (0.20) 
Level of  0.05 −0.00  −0.02  −0.09 −0.06  −0.06 
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Democracy  (0.06) (0.06)  (0.07)  (0.05) (0.05)  (0.07) 
Military 
Regimes 
 −0.30 −0.70  −0.55  −1.46 * −1.96 ** −0.73 −1.96 ** 
  (0.75) (0.75)  (1.06)  (0.70) (0.64) (0.74) (0.66) 
Workers’ Rights  −0.05 −0.19  −0.11  −0.15 −0.15  −0.14 
  (0.27) (0.27)  (0.32)  (0.25) (0.25)  (0.32) 
Civil War  −0.82 −0.96 * −1.13 −1.13  0.43 0.11  0.03 
Incidence  (0.44) (0.47) (0.61) (0.66)  (0.31) (0.33)  (0.51) 
Cold War   0.64  1.37      
   (0.78)  (1.01)      
Sub-Saharan   −1.99 ** −1.27 ** −2.10 **   −1.46 *** −1.45 *** −1.41 * 
Africa   (0.66) (0.43) (0.75)   (0.38) (0.31) (0.58) 
Latin America 
and 
  −0.19  −0.15   −1.25 ** −1.65 *** −1.27 * 
Caribbean   (0.50)  (0.66)   (0.39) (0.3) (0.49) 
East Asia and   2.14 *** 0.97 * 1.58   0.55  0.48 
Pacific   (0.64) (0.43) (0.97)   (0.42)  (0.76) 
Constant −5.55 * −7.15 * 0.07 −1.39 −1.37 3.00 * 1.27 3.89 *  3.30 
 (2.36) (3.04) (2.86) (1.30) (3.54) (1.48) (1.91) (1.83)  (2.57) 
Observations 1,164 779 779 1,364 779 684 556 556  556 
R-squared     0.20     0.25 
p> |z 0.05 *, 0.01 **, 0.001 *** All models were estimated with two-tailed significant tests and included time fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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